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Abstract
Some of the most important propositions in the political marketing literature hinge on
assumptions about the electorate. In particular, voters are presumed to react in different
ways to different orientations or postures. Yet there are theoretical reasons for ques-
tioning some of these assumptions, and certainly they have seldom been empirically
tested. Here, we focus on one prominent example of political marketing research: Lees-
Marshment’s orientations’ model. We investigate how the public reacts to product and
market orientation, whether they see a trade-off between the two (a point in dispute
among political marketing scholars), and whether partisans differ from non-partisan vot-
ers by being more inclined to value product over market orientation. Evidence from two
mass sample surveys of the British public (both conducted online by YouGov) demon-
strates important heterogeneity within the electorate, casts doubt on the core assump-
tions underlying some political marketing arguments and raises broader questions about
what voters are looking for in a party.
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Parties, voters and political marketing
The major political parties in Britain and elsewhere face a dilemma. They have had to
respond to a decline in partisanship and hence a thinning out of their traditional consti-
tuencies since the 1970s (Dalton, 2000; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995) by broadening and
diversifying their appeal. Such competitive pressures and their consequences were not an
entirely new phenomenon (Downs, 1957; Kirchheimer, 1966). Yet it is fair to say that
parties have substantially transformed in recent decades not just by utilizing more pro-
fessional methods of electioneering but ultimately by internalizing an organizational phi-
losophy that has been described as a ‘political market orientation’ (Ormrod, 2005).
This concept of political market orientation and the way in which it is contrasted with
the electoral strategies of more ideological and cleavage-based parties has a lot in com-
mon with Wellhofer’s (1990) earlier distinction between market models of ‘vote maxi-
mization’ (essentially Downsian competition) and ‘vote production’ (the mobilization of
traditional, cleavage-based support by ultimately ‘lazy monopolists’). The difference is
that, whereas Wellhofer described these as two different (but equally problematic) mar-
ket models of politics, political marketing scholars outline an evolutionary process
which fairly closely reflects recent patterns of partisan change in Britain and elsewhere:
Parties in secular, welfare states were decreasingly able to rely on appeals to class, religion
and ideology and increasingly forced to broaden their bases of support among diverse inter-
est groups. In marketing terms, this general trend of weakening party allegiances represents
a shift in market power from producers to consumers, precisely the change that transformed
business philosophy from production to marketing. (Scammell, 1999: 726)
It has been argued that a market orientation means not only to move away from
ideological purity (a product orientation) and to incorporate marketing tools when
campaigning (a sales orientation), but to use market research to find out what voters
want and to adjust policies accordingly (Lees-Marshment, 2001a). Such a move from
vote production to vote maximization, or from product to market orientation, can also
be understood as a shift in competitive posture, from leading, i.e. ‘trying to actively
convince others of the beneficial nature of a political offer’ to following, i.e. to ‘guess,
anticipate or analyse the wishes of its specific constituency and then create a political
offering that best integrates and articulates the wishes of the biggest possible number
of constituency members’ (Henneberg, 2006: 31). Ormrod and Henneberg (2006)
neatly illustrate the leading/following distinction via the Conservative slogan from the
2005 UK general election. While a market-oriented party would have assured voters
that ‘We are thinking what you are thinking’, the party instead wondered ‘Are you
thinking what we’re thinking?’ This demonstrated a clear product orientation, the Con-
servatives ‘starting with their own convictions and asking people to align themselves
with these convictions’ (2006: 32).1
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Scholars in political marketing are divided about the electoral implications of these
differing orientations or postures. Lees-Marshment states baldly that ‘if major parties
want to win general elections in Britain today they need to adopt a market orientation’
(2001b: 1081). However, there is dispute about the cross-national applicability of such a
claim (Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005; Ormrod, 2006), and more recent contributions
to the literature have cast doubt on the validity of such a clear prescription (Coleman, 2006;
Henneberg, 2006; Henneberg et al., 2009; Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy, 2009). In par-
ticular, Henneberg (2006) argues that a party adopting the posture of following, which he
also describes as being ‘customer-led’ or ‘market-driven’, can fall into the trap of being
perceived as a ‘tactical populist’ (pp. 32 ff.), a party that simply strives to win at all costs
by following public opinion, seemingly lacking clear principles. A wider tendency towards
market-oriented, customer-led or market-driven parties across the spectrum may even be
responsible for the decline in political trust (Dalton, 2004) and falling turnout (Lutz and
Marsh, 2007) across Western democracies.
We should also bear in mind that party identification and cleavage voting have dimin-
ished but not disappeared over recent decades. Herein lies the dilemma mentioned at the
outset. Parties must balance their appeals between, on the one hand, attracting new fol-
lowers through ascertaining and then satisfying their political demands, and, on the other
hand, reassuring the remnants of their traditional following through continuing emphasis
on core political principles. A minimum requirement to that effect had already been spelt
out by Downs (1957), who argued that, while parties will need to move towards the med-
ian voter to maximize their vote, they cannot leapfrog other parties if they want to retain
some basic credibility.2 A further challenge for market-driven parties arises from their
increased sensitivity to diversity among electorates and hence from marketing’s empha-
sis on segmentation and targeting (Smith and Hirst, 2001). Customizing their offerings to
the particular demands of specific target audiences may render parties vulnerable to a
challenge of inconsistency or arbitrariness in their political stances.
The responses of political-marketing scholars to this dilemma have varied.
Lees-Marshment (2001a, b) is the most obviously comfortable with the notion that there
is a definite opposition between product and market orientation, or at least a continuum
running from pure product to pure market orientation, and that parties have to choose a
position along this continuum. Others reject such a trade-off, arguing that postures of
leading and following are not mutually exclusive and that parties can simultaneously
embrace both (Henneberg, 2006: 33, 38 ff.). In particular, the concept of ‘relationship
marketing’ – ‘building long-term trust and commitment based relationships’ (Henneberg
and O’Shaughnessy, 2009: 10) – has been posited as a means of reconciling marketing’s
conceptualization of politics as a process of exchange with the social bases of partisan
politics. Henneberg et al. (2009) argue that this approach is compatible with – even
conducive to – a deliberative model of democracy. As such, it has the potential to
be part of the solution to public disenchantment with democratic politics rather than
part of the problem.
One major concern, then, for political marketing research is to clarify the nature of the
relationship between leading and following. How – and how easily – can parties be flex-
ible and adaptive to the electoral market while still emphasizing their core values and
beliefs (or ‘brand heritage’ as Henneberg (2006: 38) describes these in marketing terms)
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in order to reassure partisans and to appear generally principled. Answering these
questions involves both theoretical and empirical work, a good deal of which is under
way. However, one important facet of the task is to consider how voters themselves react
to parties’ postures or orientations. And that facet has been neglected so far, by both
political marketing scholars and students of electoral behaviour. Addressing that neglect
is the purpose of this article.
One striking feature of political marketing research is that its empirical focus is
almost always on parties rather than voters; that is, on sellers rather than buyers in the
market for votes (see Lloyd (2006) for an exception). And this may partly be the case
because ‘[marketing] models are not designed to offer post-hoc scientific explanations
of voting behaviour but to produce a broad-brush framework within which parties and
candidates can think about the development of strategy’ (Bartle and Griffiths, 2002:
30). Marketing theories tend to be prescriptive, particularly those proposing that political
parties ought to become ‘relationship builders’ (and thereby both lead and follow), while
acknowledging that no such parties exist to date (Henneberg, 2006: 38 ff.). The respec-
tive merits and shortcomings of leading and following, and the extent to which there is a
trade-off between the two, are points that are being argued rather than tested. And these
arguments frequently involve assumptions – whether explicit or implicit – about voters,
and such assumptions cannot be directly tested using evidence at the level of parties or
election outcomes.
At the same time, the individual-level evidence collected in election studies and other
political surveys has not been geared towards gauging public responses to different and
changing party orientations. In this article, we make a first attempt at testing prevalent
assumptions in political marketing theory on a representative sample of voters, thereby
broadening our understanding of public attitudes towards political parties. It addresses
questions that should be of interest to students of parties and elections in general, as well
as those interested more specifically in political marketing. How do voters tend to
respond to different and changing postures and strategies of political parties? And how
do they see the relationship between these postures or orientations? Are product and mar-
ket orientations viewed as mutually exclusive (Wellhofer, 1990) or as a zero-sum game,
a continuum where increased market orientation entails reduced product orientation
(Lees-Marshment, 2001a, b)? Or are public attitudes consistent with Henneberg’s
(2006) assertion that parties can and should aim to lead at the same time as follow?
Beginning to test theories of political marketing on voters
As in any strand of political research, there are differences and disagreements among
political marketing researchers. Whether or not a ‘political marketing paradigm’ can
be identified, there is plainly no theoretical framework or set of assumptions that is com-
mon across all those working in the field. In our empirical work, then, we cannot there-
fore test some putative ‘theory of political marketing’ – there is no such thing. Nor can
we confront voters with anything like the full range of assumptions and theoretical nuan-
ces evident in the literature. Even assuming infinite patience on the part of survey
respondents, the problem remains that a closed-ended questionnaire approach is unsuited
to capturing that kind of subtlety. In short, we have to choose which model of party
4 Party Politics
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marketing strategy to test. For three reasons, we opt for Lees-Marshment’s (2001a, b)
orientations model. First, it is best known to students of electoral behaviour and so is
an obvious starting-point for those seeking to bridge the gap between political marketing
and that sub-discipline. Second, British parties were central to the conception and devel-
opment of Lees-Marshment’s model, and these are the parties which are evaluated by
voters in our research. Third, Lees-Marshment offers unusually clear descriptions of
party orientations, descriptions which come in useful for our survey work.
These reasons are practical more than substantive. There is no reason why competing
theories or models within political marketing could not be subject to parallel empirical
work with voters. Ultimately, we have to start somewhere. That is not to say that the
analyses here should be regarded as irrelevant for researchers favouring alternative inter-
pretations and frameworks. First, the fact that a study is intended to test one model does
not preclude it from generating evidence pertinent to other models. Survey design
becomes crucial here: the questions must not be based on the assumptions underlying
Lees-Marshment’s model, but should test them. For example, questions about product
and market orientation should allow the two to be seen as wholly incompatible, wholly
compatible and any point in between. Thus, the responses to such questions can bear on
political marketing research beyond Lees-Marshment’s work. Second, and related, ter-
minological differences should not obscure the fact that there is at least some shared
understanding of core concepts. For instance, the distinction between product and mar-
ket orientation runs pretty closely parallel to Henneberg’s (2006: 34) distinctions
between leading and following, and between market-driving and market-driven orien-
tations. Hence, again, there is scope for a study of Lees-Marshment’s orientations to
have wider relevance. Next, we set out three core research questions that the survey
was designed to address.
Q1. Do voters recognize the product/market distinction?
According to Lees-Marshment (2001b), a party’s electoral prospects depend (at least in
part) on its orientation. That does not, of course, presuppose that voters actually notice
and distinguish different orientations. To invoke a closely related example, a Downsian
theorist could argue that voting decisions conform to a spatial logic even if voters
are not necessarily undertaking the calculations (see Friedman, 1953: ch. 1). And
Lees-Marshment (2001c: 700) argues that the success of the Conservatives in the 1980s
was owed to the party’s ability to adopt a market orientation while maintaining a reputation
among voters as product-oriented, thanks in particular to the established view of Thatcher
as a conviction politician. The implication is that market orientation may prove highly suc-
cessful even if – perhaps especially if – undetected. Indeed, ‘those in any party may deny
being market-oriented for all sorts of reasons’ (ibid., p. 705).
On other occasions, however, Lees-Marshment implies that the benefits of a market
orientation will only accrue if voters recognize that shift. She links market orientation to
the fulfilling of promises in government, arguing that it can thereby help in overcoming
public cynicism about parties, but acknowledges that this reputation for delivery depends
on ‘the extent to which [parties] become market-oriented and voters become aware of it’
(2001c: 700, emphasis added). More fundamentally, the paradigm case of political
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marketing, ‘New’ Labour, is argued to have achieved its success precisely because voters
did notice and responded to the party’s shift from product to market. The notion that par-
ties seek to conceal their marketing orientations leads to some odd inferences, for example
that Tony Blair was wincing with embarrassment after the very public conference battle
over Clause IV of the party’s constitution, rather than delighting in that opportunity to
spotlight the party’s change in approach.3 Since political marketing theories are precisely
about how parties present themselves to and are seen by voters, it seems a reasonable
empirical question to ask whether differences in orientations are noticed by the voters.
Naturally, we would not expect voters to be familiar with the terminology of product
and market orientations. However, when these notions are explained in straightforward
language – about parties sticking by what they traditionally believe in, or changing their
policies in line with public opinion – then there seems no major obstacle to understand-
ing them. As Ferejohn (1995: 107) points out, the spatial metaphor is in common usage
well beyond academic treatments of party politics. And in Britain, the empirical focus of
this study, the key developments in electoral politics over the past quarter of a century
have been often and easily framed in terms reminiscent of the product–market distinc-
tion. Both ‘New’ Labour’s triumphs and the healthy Conservative poll leads throughout
2008 and 2009 were interpreted as showing that those parties have successfully man-
oeuvred into the ‘centre ground’ of politics. Equally, both parties’ periods in the electoral
doldrums are associated with a lurch to the extremes – or, less melodramatically, with a
retreat into traditional values and priorities – and thus a failure to attract more than core
support. We are interested not only in whether voters understand the terms but also, in
particular, in whether they recognize the trade-off between the two orientations. As
Lees-Marshment (2001b: 1082) points out, the different orientations are ideal types
and most real-world parties will show a mix of the two. Nevertheless, it is inherent
in her definitions that a party can only become more market-oriented by shifting away
from a product orientation, or vice versa. Furthermore, the idea that parties face such a
trade-off also underlies the narratives of British politics sketched above. Evidence that
voters see no such conflict would certainly raise questions about their use and under-
standing of these ideas.
Q2. Is a market orientation more popular?
Earlier, we quoted Lees-Marshment’s assertion that a major party ‘needs to adopt a mar-
ket orientation in order to win a general election’. This suggests a straightforward ‘yes’
in response to Q2. We should restate the caveat that adopting a market orientation is not
the same as being recognized by voters as doing so, and that (as quoted above) ‘those in
any party may deny being market-oriented for all sorts of reasons’. This does hint at the
idea that an obvious market orientation may incur electoral costs, and Lilleker’s (2005)
focus group data do suggest that some non-voters in 2001 would have turned out but for
‘New’ Labour’s shift away from its traditional product. More often, however, the clear
implication of Lees-Marshment’s arguments is that market orientation is electorally ben-
eficial, and that it need not be surreptitious to deliver these benefits. After all, as noted
earlier, some of the key examples of market-oriented parties have sought publicly to
make a virtue of their responsiveness to public opinion.
6 Party Politics
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This is not to say that market-oriented parties are argued by Lees-Marshment to be
nothing but slavish pursuers of public opinion. There are inevitably constraints on these
parties’ responsiveness to voters, notably the need for promises to be deliverable and the
need to keep party members happy. Nonetheless, the basic argument holds: to the extent
that a party is able – within these limits – to respond to voters’ wants and demands, it will
be more electorally successful. Any indication that market orientations actually prove
less popular would certainly raise serious questions about Lees-Marshment’s core argu-
ments. Certainly, if these arguments are more than a restatement of the Downsian model,
parties should be rewarded not only for moving closer to the median voter but more
broadly for adopting an approach to politics that places responsiveness above a commit-
ment to existing stances (Lees-Marshment, 2001c: 696–700). In order to test this, we
examine whether voters who see a particular party as more market-oriented regard it
more favourably than those who see that party as predominantly product-oriented.
Related, but introducing an element of comparison, we examine whether voters who see
one party as more market-oriented than another tend to prefer the former. In both cases,
we also examine the relationship between perceived orientations and attitudes towards
the parties while controlling for a comprehensive set of other variables established in the
electoral behaviour literature as significant predictors of party choice. We can thus assess
whether orientation perceptions are able to make an independent contribution to our
understanding of how attitudes to parties are formed.
Q3. Is preference among orientations moderated by partisanship?
Dunleavy (1996: 280–281) criticizes political scientists in general for their failure ade-
quately to recognize heterogeneity in the electorate, in particular noting frequent use of
the ‘archetypal singular’ when describing voters. The complaint applies to much of the
political marketing literature as well. It is easy to refer to ‘the voters’ as if they all share
the same needs and wants, the same demands of and reactions to parties. This is self-
evidently not the case. For one thing, winning a British general election is not about win-
ning the support of ‘the voters’; it is rather about winning support from enough of the
swing voters in marginal seats (Lilleker, 2005; Ormrod, 2005).4 Such ‘swing’ voters are
by definition not party identifiers, and this presumably explains why researchers in the
field have paid so little attention to partisanship. The ends of political marketing can be
achieved without recourse to those voters who report such an attachment. Q3, then, does
not derive directly from the political marketing literature. Often the only mention of
party loyalties is a note that they are weakening – it is this trend that is held to have
opened up the market for votes (e.g. Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 14; Newman, 1999: 126).
Yet, dealignment notwithstanding, self-identified partisans still make up around half
of the British electorate. And we might expect their reaction to orientations – certainly to
the orientation of ‘their’ party – to differ from the reaction of those swing voters who are
the target of a market orientation. Put simply, partisans tend to like the existing product.
This is partly because they are predisposed to endorse what their party does and says any-
way. It is also because, at least on a Michigan-style reading, partisanship derives from
social location, and social location influences the kind of product that voters want
(Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002). The link is nicely encapsulated in the term
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 at Library - Periodicals Dept on May 22, 2013ppq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
‘heartlands’, the areas in which a party is best liked and in which its existing product is
most in demand. A familiar argument from political debate in Britain over the past
decade is that ‘New’ Labour deserted these heartlands – heavily industrialized and union-
ized urban areas, predominantly in the north – and thus alienated those voters who
favoured the traditional left-of-centre line of products that was discontinued (see Lilleker,
2005; Scott, 2000; Wring, 2005).5 We would therefore expect product orientation to be
relatively popular among supporters of the party in question, and market orientation (for
all parties) to be relatively popular among non-partisans. If those expectations are con-
founded, that raises questions both about the nature of partisanship as sketched above and,
more importantly for present purposes, about the need for a market orientation in order to
win over swing voters and thus win elections.
Data and measures
The data come from two surveys of the British electorate, both conducted over the Inter-
net by YouGov. The first was a YouGov omnibus survey, fielded between 29 May and 2
June 2008 and with a sample size of 2,461. The second was fielded between 24 February
and 3 March 2009 as part of the British Election Study (BES) Continuous Monitoring
Survey. The sample size was 951. In both cases, results presented here are based on data
weighted to make the sample representative of the British electorate (in terms of a com-
bination of variables including age, gender, social class, newspaper readership and past
vote). Most of the data analysis in this article is based on the first survey, in which we
explore the relationship between orientation perceptions as well as their association with
partisan attitudes. However, only the second survey offers the kind of wide array of con-
trol variables necessary to test whether orientation perceptions have an independent
impact on party preferences.
The core measures in both surveys are those gauging respondents’ perceptions of the
orientations of the three main parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat). In
order to make these as valid as possible a test of Lees-Marshment’s model, the question
stems were drawn almost verbatim from her descriptions of those orientations (2001a:
28–30). Since, as noted earlier, scholars in political marketing differ over the compatibil-
ity of these orientations, we were interested to see whether voters envisaged a trade-off.
Hence, in the first survey, we asked about the two orientations separately. The first ques-
tion was: ‘A product-oriented party argues for the policies it believes in, and sticks by
them even if they are unpopular with many voters. Please say how accurately you feel
this describes each of the following parties.’ A seven-point response scale was used, run-
ning from ‘not at all accurately’ to ‘very accurately’. There followed a parallel question,
this time opening with: ‘A market-oriented party finds out what most voters want, and is
willing to change what it stands for to meet those demands.’6
In the second survey, constraints on space meant that we were not able to ask about
the orientations separately but instead asked respondents to place the parties along an
11-point product-oriented to market-oriented scale (with the orientations described as
above and the extreme points labelled as ‘strongly product-oriented’ and ‘strongly mar-
ket-oriented’). This practical necessity has a methodological advantage, allowing us to
test whether the key findings hold across different operationalizations of the core
8 Party Politics
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measures. Specifically, this second survey imposes on respondents the same trade-off
envisaged in Lees-Marshment’s approach.
It might be wondered why we included the specific terminology rather than simply
describing what these orientations are. The reason is that, since we were asking the same
questions about several different parties, repeating the full descriptions would quickly
have become tiresome for respondents. At the same time, trying to condense the descrip-
tions would have compromised our claim to be testing the orientations as described by
Lees-Marshment. The same can be said of swapping in more idiomatic descriptions like
‘a party that follows’ and ‘a party that leads’. While these have the virtue of brevity, they
also bring in a range of other considerations that would have seriously impaired the
validity of the study. Indeed, the fact that respondents will not have heard of the orienta-
tion terms before, and would be unlikely to grasp their content without a description,
could be argued to be an advantage. Responses are likely to be driven more by the way
that the orientations are described than by the labels. The latter are simply intended as a
short-hand to remind respondents of those descriptions. One implication of this is that the
results can still be of interest to those who reject Lees-Marshment’s choice of labels for
the orientations that she outlines.
In order to address Q2, concerning the popularity of different orientations, we needed
an independent measure of attitudes to parties. We used the standard propensity-to-vote
(PTV) measure that is argued by van der Eijk and Niemo¨ller (1983) to reflect electoral
utility and, in any case, provides a useful scale measure of attitudes to the parties. The
question is worded thus: ‘On a scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely), how likely
is it that you would ever vote for each of these parties?’ This is available in both surveys.
The measures of partisanship required to address Q3 differ across the surveys. The sec-
ond uses the traditional Michigan ‘Generally speaking . . . ’ version, while, in the first,
we use the ‘alternative’ party identification question which has been shown to elicit
much lower proportions of identifiers in the population – around half as opposed to over
80 percent with the Michigan wording (Sanders et al., 2002). The ‘alternative’ wording
is: ‘Some people think of themselves as usually being a supporter of one political party
rather than another. Do you usually think of yourself as being a supporter of one par-
ticular party or not?’7 Having first addressed Q2 and Q3 by exploring the bivariate
relationships between orientation perceptions and likelihood of voting for the parties,
we then test fuller models of PTV, using the second survey and the wide range of con-
trol variables that it offers, in order to test whether those bivariate relationships hold in
a multivariate context.
Political marketing and party loyalties – the evidence
Q1. Do voters recognize the product/market distinction?
Before we examine how respondents perceived the parties’ orientations, it is first worth
looking at how willing and able they were to supply such ratings. A non-response (‘don’t
know’) option was explicitly offered throughout the questionnaire.
Given that survey respondents generally display considerable willingness to answer
questions, even if highly unsure of their views, the average 20 percent non-response rate
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on these orientation questions looks high (and still higher in comparison with the mean
5 percent non-response to the PTV questions). This could indicate that many voters sim-
ply do not recognize the notions at the heart of political marketing analysis; alternatively,
it could be that those notions are understood by voters but were not clearly conveyed to
them by our question designs. At this stage it is very difficult to adjudicate between the
two possibilities, but we return to this issue in the concluding section.8
Now we turn to the ratings of the parties supplied by those who did answer the orien-
tation questions. Figure 1 illustrates the mean scores for the three main parties on both
orientation variables. At the bottom of each pair of columns we report two statistics: a
dependent-samples t-statistic for the difference between that party’s mean product-
orientation and market-orientation scores; and the correlation between the two sets of
perceptions; that is, the extent to which respondents see the two orientations as con-
nected. The columns are remarkably similar in height with one exception: the Conserva-
tives are clearly seen as being particularly market-oriented. It is impossible to know
whether this is an enduring or temporary result, though it tallies with recent political his-
tory and Cameron’s overt attempts to reposition the party in the centre ground. Although,
at the time of our survey, most political commentators would probably have regarded
Labour as still occupying that territory, too, the party was not seen by voters as partic-
ularly market-driven or unusually remote from its traditional product.
Strikingly, the correlations are all more or less zero. Voters see virtually no trade-off
between the two orientations. Only with Labour, and then only to a tiny extent, do
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Figure 1. Mean perceptions of product/market orientation for the three main parties.
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responses reflect the negative correlation between product and market orientation that
the political marketing literature would lead us to expect. As these negligible correla-
tions imply, substantial minorities of respondents regarded parties as simultaneously
both market-oriented and product-oriented. Eight percent of our sample rated the Con-
servatives at 5 or higher on both scales, and over 18 percent gave them a 4 or higher
on both. The corresponding proportions for Labour were 4 percent and 12 percent, for
the Liberal Democrats 3 percent and 9 percent. Clearly, quite a few voters think that a
party can both stick by its policies no matter what and be willing to change in order
to meet demand. This suggests that voters disagree with Lees-Marshment’s interpreta-
tion of the relationship between the two orientations, and instead endorse Henneberg’s
(2006) argument that parties can indeed both lead and follow. (Or, for that matter, they
can do neither. Non-trivial proportions of respondents rated the Conservatives (8 per-
cent), Labour (12 percent) and the Liberal Democrats (8 percent) as ‘not at all’
product-oriented or market-oriented.)
Predictably, respondents rating a party highly on both orientations tended to be iden-
tifiers with that party, and those rating a party at ‘not at all’ on either orientation tended
(via the PTV measures) to have indicated a strong distaste for that party. These respon-
dents presumably regarded each orientation as a positive characteristic, and were keen to
credit a preferred party with both or to accuse a disliked party for lacking either. It might
then be thought that partisan bias conceals the ‘real’ and expected negative correlation
between the two orientations. This turns out not to be the case, however. When the anal-
ysis was repeated including only those respondents disclaiming any party identification,
the product/market correlation for Labour was basically unchanged (–0.04) and for the
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats actually became more clearly positive (0.15
and 0.14, respectively). Even these more ‘objective’ judges of the parties see no neces-
sary trade-off between product and market orientation.
Q2. Is a market orientation more popular?
Here, we consider how voters evaluate product and market orientations by examining the
relationship between orientation perceptions and willingness to vote for the party in
question. Our initial finding from Figure 1, namely that the Conservatives appear more
market-oriented than the others, tends to support Lees-Marshment’s core argument. At
the time of the first survey, carried out before the ‘credit crunch’ triggered a brief dip
in the party’s popularity, the Conservatives enjoyed a substantial opinion poll lead. This
is reflected in our data: that party’s mean PTV score (5.1) was markedly higher than
those of Labour (3.8) and the Liberal Democrats (3.7). To use classic marketing lingo,
one might conclude that the Conservatives’ ‘unique selling point’ was their market
orientation, and therein lay their advantage over the other parties.
Of course, this is a speculative finding based only on aggregate relationships. We
need to investigate the individual-level relationships between perceived orientations and
readiness to vote for a party. The left-hand graph in Figure 2 shows mean PTV scores for
each party among those rating that party at each level of product orientation. The right-
hand graph does the same but for market orientation. (Relationships for all three parties
are presented together for reasons of economy of presentation.)
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Perhaps the most obvious feature of both graphs is the evident curvilinearity of the
relationships between orientations and popularity. For all three parties, only up to a point
do increases in perceived product-orientation or market-orientation serve to increase
respondents’ willingness to vote for that party. However, the turning-point varies both
across orientations and across parties. The left-hand graph is more obviously skewed,
with parties given the maximum rating for product orientation proving much more pop-
ular than those given the minimum rating. The right-hand graph is more symmetrical,
with voters unimpressed by parties rated as ‘very market-oriented’, although again the
lowest PTVs are found at the lower end of the orientation rating scale. In short, the
answer to Q2 is ‘no’. Although neither orientation is popular beyond a certain point, that
point arrives sooner with market orientation, and the shallower upward gradient in the
right-hand graph also suggests that market orientation has a generally weaker association
with willingness to vote for a party. That said, there are hints that the relative popularity
of orientations differs across parties. For the Conservatives, product-orientation is
clearly more popular than market-orientation: in terms of PTV for that party, the optimal
rating was 5 on product but only around 3–4 on market orientation. For Labour, the ben-
efits of product orientation run out sooner, while the market orientation graph does not
noticeably turn downwards until the maximum rating. The Conservatives are rewarded
more for product while Labour is rewarded more for market orientation.
The wealth of information in the graphs above risks obscuring the central point about
the relative popularity of orientations. Next, then, we approach that question from a dif-
ferent angle, calculating between-party differentials on each orientation for each of the
three pairs of major parties. These differentials run from –6 to þ6 (one party seen as
‘very’, the other seen as ‘not at all’, product-oriented or market-oriented), with 0 indicat-
ing that the parties were seen as equally oriented in that way. We then plotted PTV scores
for each of the parties in that pair against these orientation differentials. The resulting
graphs illustrate how the relative popularity of parties covaries with perceptions of their
respective orientations. Put another way, they allow us to gauge the extent to which
being judged as more product-oriented or market-oriented than one of its rivals gives
a party a potential electoral advantage. In Figure 3 we present graphs for each pair of
parties: Conservative versus Labour (Figure 3.1), Conservative versus Liberal Democrat
(Figure 3.2) and Labour versus Liberal Democrat (Figure 3.3). In each case, the left-hand
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Figure 2. Perceived product/market orientation and propensity to vote for all parties.
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Figure 3. PTV scores for pairs of parties by differentials in their perceived orientations.
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panel plots PTV scores against the product orientation differential while the market
orientation graphs are in the right-hand panel.
There is a striking difference between left and right panels: the beneficial effect of
being perceived as more product-oriented is consistently and markedly stronger than the
corresponding effect of market orientation. For each pair of parties, the party that is seen
as the more product-oriented is always more popular and its popularity increases as its
advantage on this orientation widens. In contrast, being seen as more market-oriented
than a rival does not help a party to anything like the same extent. At least between
Labour and the Conservatives we see strong effects at the extreme ends of the scale: that
is, those who see one of these parties as very market-oriented and the other as not market-
oriented at all will prefer the former. But smaller perceived differences do not translate
into popularity gains. And, from the two pairings involving the Liberal Democrats, an
even more ambiguous picture emerges. That party in particular seems not to gain at all
from being perceived as more market-oriented. Aside from a peak at –5 in the two right-
hand graphs (i.e. those who see the Liberal Democrats as leading the other two parties by
5 points on the market-orientation scale), the Liberal Democrat PTV scores do not relate
in any systematic fashion to how much more or less market-oriented they appear to
respondents. On this evidence, the answer to Q2 remains a quite firm ‘no’. A perceived
advantage on product orientation is exactly that – an advantage. By contrast, parties gain
much less from being seen as more market-oriented, whether this is in absolute terms or
relative to their rivals.
Q3. Is preference among orientations moderated by partisanship?
The results so far sit uneasily with some of the core assumptions underlying Lees-
Marshment’s political marketing model. In particular, they suggest that a publicly per-
ceived move from product to market orientation can incur a cost. However, it could
be that the overall preference for product orientation is driven by party identifiers (and
their greater attachment to parties’ products). In that case, Lees-Marshment could nev-
ertheless be correct that a publicly recognizable marketing orientation is the key to win-
ning an election. Even if not preferred by the electorate as a whole, it may still prove
more popular among the non-partisan voters who swing election outcomes. To test this,
we examine the relationship between orientation ratings and PTV scores among two
groups: those who identify with the party in question, and those who identify with none
of the parties. This relationship is the same as that explored in Figure 2, but to avoid a
surfeit of graphs we condense the information into a table of correlation coefficients
(Table 1). To account for the curvilinearity of the relationship between orientation per-
ception and likelihood to vote for a party, we correlated PTV scores both with orienta-
tion perceptions (in the upper panel of the table) but also with squared orientation
perceptions (lower panel). For these squared terms, the orientation scales were centred
around zero, which means that high values indicate extreme (high or low) market or
product orientation and low values more middling scores.
As a point of comparison for our subgroups, the first two columns show correlations
for the entire set of respondents. Since the full sample was the basis for Figure 2, this first
set of results can be used as a guide to how the correlations summarize the patterns
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illustrated in those graphs. Hence, the positive correlations in the upper panel reflect the
broadly upward trend in the graphs, the stronger coefficients for product orientation
reflect the fact that the product graphs had a more pronounced upward slope, and the
negative correlations with the squared terms in the lower panel reflect the downturn
in the graphs at higher levels of each orientation – that is, the negative reaction to parties
perceived as too market or product-oriented.
From the remaining columns in Table 1, we can see that this public demand for
moderation on both counts is strongest among non-identifers. It is not the case that
floating voters reward market rather than product orientation – there is some sign of
that with the Labour Party, yet if anything the reverse is true with the Conservatives.
Rather, they are particularly inclined to punish parties showing an undue preoccupa-
tion with either product or market. Among party identifiers, there is the broad tendency
– in line with expectations – for product orientation to win more favour than market
orientation, but the differences are slight and vary across party. Only with Liberal
Democrat supporters is there a markedly stronger preference for product than for mar-
ket orientation. The same is true but much less obviously so for Labour identifiers; they
also show a greater inclination to punish ‘excess’ market than product orientation.
Meanwhile, there are only weak correlations for Conservative identifiers (partly
because their mean PTV score for the party was so close to the scale’s maximum point
that there was limited statistical traction for gauging its covariation with the orientation
scores). The more conspicuous feature of the results among party identifiers is that they
are much less concerned about moderation. Correlations between PTV scores and
squared orientation perceptions only just reach statistical significance for Labour and
Conservatives and fail to do so for the Liberal Democrats, and for all three parties the
estimates are substantially below those we see for non-identifiers. In summary, the data
in Table 1 provide some grounds for answering ‘yes’ to Q3, and thus argue against the
tendency in Lees-Marshment’s model to homogenize the electorate. Yet the moderat-
ing effect of partisanship is neither clear-cut nor in quite the direction that we forecast.
In particular, the simple ‘partisans prefer product; non-partisans prefer market’ model
receives little support.
Table 1. Correlations between orientation ratings (main and quadratic terms) and PTV for a
party: (a) all voters; (b) identifiers with that party; (c) all non-identifiers
a) All voters b) Identifiers with that party c) All non-identifiers
Product Market Product Market Product Market
Conservatives 0.521 0.160 0.190 0.124 0.353 0.255
Labour 0.344 0.260 0.281 0.188 0.145 0.294
Lib Dems 0.375 0.156 0.401 (0.113) 0.321 0.204
Product2 Market2 Product2 Market2 Product2 Market2
Conservatives 0.285 0.261 0.105 0.122 0.268 0.206
Labour 0.298 0.335 0.115 0.220 0.379 0.401
Lib Dems 0.204 0.262 (0.009) (0.133) 0.239 0.276
NB. All correlations other than those in parentheses are significant at the p<0.05 level.
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Multivariate models
In the discussions above, we were prone to draw causal inferences from the correla-
tional data. For example, if perceptions of a particular orientation were positively cor-
related with propensity to vote for a party, we referred to voters ‘rewarding’ parties for
that orientation. The implied causal link from orientations to party preference is, of
course, the crux of Lees-Marshment’s model. Yet this causality is inferred rather than
demonstrated. Moreover, there is reason to suppose that the causality is spurious: that
is, orientation perceptions are driven by prior attitudes to the parties that are also the
real drivers of PTV scores. (We noted this possibility earlier when considering those
who scored a party very low or very high on both product and market scales.) This kind
of endogeneity problem confronts any researcher seeking to estimate the impact of
party evaluations on party choice (see, e.g., Wlezien et al., 1997). However, it can
be mitigated considerably by holding constant as many as possible of those prior vari-
ables that might influence both orientation perceptions and propensity to vote for a
party. We used a crude method of control in the previous section when analysing par-
tisans and non-partisans separately. A more sophisticated approach is to test multivari-
ate models of PTV for the three parties, in each case including various controls in
addition to the orientation perception variables. The second survey, fielded within a
BES questionnaire, offers a comprehensive set of such controls: socio-demographic
variables, newspaper readership, party identification, party leader attitudes, economic
expectations and reactions to the financial crisis, perceived party competence on
valence issues, and respondents’ stances on position issues. We can therefore run very
well-specified models of likelihood to vote for the three parties, closely replicating
those shown by the BES researchers to account for much of the variation in party
choice in Britain (Clarke et al., 2004, 2009).
The full list of controls used can be read in Table 2, in which we present the three
regression models. The lower rows contain the orientation perception effects that are our
main concern here. Note that, since we have switched to the second survey, we no longer
have separate variables for product and market orientation; instead, these are based on
the bipolar scale running from product to market. For each party, we report coefficients
for two orientation variables: the basic ratings and the squared ratings.9
These results show that the patterns identified earlier in this article are robust against
multivariate controls. Most notably, all three parties are being rewarded for striking a
balance between product and market orientation. This is indicated by the strong and sig-
nificant negative effects of the quadratic terms. Parties are penalized if perceived as
located close to either end of the scale. In the multivariate context, we find less consistent
evidence of a preference for product over market. On the one hand, there is a significant
main effect for the Liberal Democrats in that direction, with those perceiving the party as
more market-oriented being less likely to vote for them. On the other hand, we find that
respondents who perceive Labour as more product-oriented are slightly (but not signif-
icantly) less likely to vote for the party and also (and significantly) more likely to vote
Conservative. This recalls our previous finding that Labour is substantially less likely to
benefit from product orientation than the other two parties. It also highlights that prob-
ability to vote for a party can also depend on how you perceive its rival(s) to be oriented.
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The Conservative Party proved more popular among voters approving of its product-
market balance but also among those feeling that Labour had strayed too far towards the
product end of the scale.
These significant effects confirm that voters’ perceptions of party orientation matter.
They are clearly significant even when controlling for a host of predictors of party choice
(and in models in which – at least for the Conservatives and Labour – a large proportion
of the variation in PTV is explained). They are also powerful – often more so than
the effects of core valence judgements (such as a party’s performance on issues such
as the NHS and crime). Aside from party identification, the squared orientation effects
Table 2. Coefficients for orientation perceptions from regressions of PTV for each party
PTV Conservative PTV Labour PTV Lib Dem
B s.e. beta B s.e. beta B s.e. beta
Constant 1.90 0.77 ** 1.07 0.83 3.88 1.04 ***
Age 0.01 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.08**
Gender 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.20 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.23 0.01
Class AB 0.63 0.20 0.08*** 0.81 0.22 0.10*** 0.31 0.27 0.05
Class C1 0.41 0.23 0.04* 0.52 0.25 0.06** 0.47 0.31 0.06
Own home 0.11 0.21 0.01 0.24 0.23 0.03 0.05 0.29 0.01
Non-whites 0.59 0.38 0.03 0.04 0.41 0.00 0.02 0.50 0.00
Right-wing tabloid 0.18 0.21 0.02 0.30 0.23 0.04 0.60 0.28 0.09**
Left-wing tabloid 0.62 0.31 0.05** 1.11 0.34 0.08*** 0.55 0.42 0.05
Right-wing broadsheet 0.05 0.28 0.00 0.51 0.30 0.05* 0.45 0.37 0.05
Left-wing broadsheet 0.76 0.35 0.05** 0.48 0.38 0.03 0.39 0.47 0.03
Conservative identifier 1.29 0.27 0.14*** 1.84 0.30 0.20*** 0.98 0.37 0.13***
Labour identifier 0.87 0.24 0.11*** 2.19 0.26 0.27*** 0.02 0.33 0.00
Lib Dem identifier 0.88 0.37 0.06** 1.31 0.39 0.09*** 3.23 0.48 0.28***
Brown best PM 0.22 0.29 0.02 0.41 0.31 0.05 0.46 0.39 0.06
Cameron best PM 1.54 0.26 0.19*** 0.02 0.28 0.00 0.06 0.35 0.01
Clegg best PM 0.64 0.39 0.04* 0.09 0.42 0.01 1.77 0.52 0.14***
National economic expectations 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.00
Government handling
financial crisis
0.31 0.11 0.09*** 0.57 0.12 0.17*** 0.23 0.15 0.08
Opposition handling financial crisis 0.73 0.12 0.20*** 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.36 0.17 0.12**
Personally affected by crisis 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.02
Government handling crime 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.30 0.12 0.08** 0.16 0.15 0.05
Government handling NHS 0.23 0.10 0.06** 0.27 0.11 0.08** 0.01 0.14 0.00
Opposition handling crime 0.17 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.15 0.03
Opposition handling NHS 0.42 0.12 0.12*** 0.22 0.12 0.07* 0.16 0.16 0.06
Conservatives best on MIP 1.27 0.28 0.14*** 0.30 0.30 0.03 0.51 0.38 0.07
Labour best on MIP 0.16 0.27 0.02 0.51 0.29 0.06** 0.12 0.37 0.02
Lib Dem best on MIP 0.29 0.46 0.02 0.35 0.50 0.02 1.88 0.62 0.12***
Approve Iraq War 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.33 0.15 0.08**
Approve EU membership 0.12 0.11 0.03 0.28 0.11 0.07** 0.52 0.14 0.15***
Conservative market vs. product 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.05
Conservative (market vs. product)2 0.02 0.01 0.05* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Labour market vs. product 0.05 0.03 0.04* 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01
Labour (market vs. product)2 0.02 0.01 0.05** 0.04 0.01 0.10*** 0.01 0.01 0.02
Lib Dem market vs. product 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.07**
LibDem (market vs. product)2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.18***
R2 0.76 0.72 0.39
N 628 627 625
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are the most powerful in the Liberal Democrat model, the second most powerful in the
Labour model, and far from trivial in the Conservative model.
In order to address Q3, we added interaction terms between the orientation variables
and party identification. Rather than repeating the full models, in Table 3 we report only
the orientation effects along with these new interaction terms. The dearth of significant
effects among the interaction terms argues for a ‘no’ in response to Q3. In none of the
cases is there the expected significant and negative interaction between party identifica-
tion and the main orientation variable, which would have indicated that identifiers placed
particular value on that party’s product. And only for Labour identifiers is there a signif-
icant interaction with the squared orientation. This, at least, is in the expected direction:
the positive sign denotes that party identifiers are less likely to demand that their party
strikes a balance between product and market orientation.
We conclude the paper by illustrating the net effects of orientation perceptions on
party preferences. The graphs in Figure 4 are based on predicted values of PTV from the
full regression models. In each case, we calculate the mean predicted value among those
rating that party at each point of the orientation scale. Three features of the graphs are
worth noting and serve as a useful summary of our key findings. First, all parties are
clearly penalised when perceived as strongly oriented in either direction. Second, even
with extensive controls, the effects of orientation perceptions are striking. The slopes
become quite steep, especially towards the extreme points (a point that is of substantive
significance given that non-trivial percentages of respondents located parties at those
extremes). Third, there are marked differences across the parties. For Labour, the graph
is not obviously skewed in either direction. However, for the Conservatives and Liberal
Table 3. Main, squared and interaction (with party ID) effects of orientation perceptions on PTV
PTV Conservative PTV Labour PTV Lib Dem
B s.e. beta B s.e. beta B s.e. beta
Main and squared effects
Con market vs. product 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05
Con (market vs. product)2 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Lab market vs. product 0.05 0.04 0.04* 0.07 0.04 0.05* 0.01 0.04 0.00
Lab (market vs. product)2 0.02 0.01 0.05** 0.06 0.01 0.15*** 0.01 0.01 0.02
LD market vs. product 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.08**
LD (market vs. product)2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.18***
Interactions with party ID
Con ID * orientation 0.01 0.08 0.00
Con ID * orientation2 0.04 0.03 0.04
Lab ID * orientation 0.09 0.07 0.04
Lab ID * orientation2 0.06 0.02 0.10***
LD ID * orientation 0.18 0.14 0.05
LD ID * orientation2 0.04 0.05 0.04
R2 0.76 0.72 0.39
N 628 627 625
NB. In order to avoid collinearity problems, we do not estimate all the interaction terms for all the parties in
the same model. The interactions with Conservative identification are therefore included when modelling the
probability to vote Conservative, and so on for the other two parties.
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Democrats, the peak of the graph is clearly to the left of the midpoint, signalling the
relative popularity of product orientation.
Conclusions
The ideas at the heart of Lees-Marshment’s political marketing model – that parties face a
trade-off between sticking by their traditional stances and modifying these to please a
greater number of voters, and that a party favouring the latter approach will perform better
in elections – are not abstruse academic notions. They dominate popular discourse about
electoral politics. It seems unlikely then that, once explained in more everyday terms, the
product/market distinction will have proved too unfamiliar or difficult for survey respon-
dents. Yet the straightforward predictions generated from the Lees-Marshment model were
confounded when tested on individual-level data, both in bivariate and multivariate anal-
yses. Voters did not recognize the trade-off between the two orientations, and they did not
on the whole prefer market orientation. Even non-partisan voters, the main targets of mar-
ket orientation, tended on balance to prefer product orientation.
One possible explanation for this is that our survey measures were confusing or mis-
leading. The hefty proportions of non-response on the orientation questions point in that
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Figure 4. Mean predicted PTV values for each party by its perceived orientation (calculated from
regression models in Table 2).
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direction. However, those who did respond do not appear simply to have supplied
‘non-attitudes’, answers delivered more or less at random in order to fulfil their obliga-
tions as respondents. It is not that the responses lacked structure, but rather that their
structure differs from that which Lees-Marshment’s model leads us to expect. Moreover,
the fact that respondents identified the Conservatives as the most market-oriented party sug-
gests that – as in the case of ‘New’ Labour and many other important examples for market-
ing scholars – significant shifts towards a market orientation do not go unnoticed. The
question is whether those shifts in themselves prove popular with voters. Judging by our
data, it is far from clear that they do. Rather, voters – more or less across the board – want
a bit of both orientations. They endorse a party that will stick to its core principles without
being intransigent, and a party that is responsive to public opinion but again not indiscrimi-
nately so. Most importantly, they see these demands as compatible. A party can both stand
by what it believes in and shift in response to public opinion, according to many voters.
This will not come as a surprise to some political marketing scholars (e.g. Henneberg,
2006; Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy, 2009), or those researching marketing more gen-
erally (Connor 1999), who have argued in detail that there is no such trade-off between
leading and following. Follow-up work to this study could put their rival theoretical argu-
ments to parallel testing of voters’ reactions. Meanwhile, once the assumption of an auto-
matic trade-off between product and market orientation is relaxed, Lees-Marshment’s
claim that a marketing orientation is necessary in order to win elections starts to look more
accurate. It is a matter of degree, however. Judging by our data, a party will not be popular
with voters who see it as wholly inflexible in the face of public opinion. Hence parties
probably do need to be somewhat market-oriented in order to win elections. But they risk
unpopularity if they seem too ready to bend to public demand, and they certainly will not
be rewarded for appearing heedless of their core principles and policies. (The maxim for
parties should be ‘everything in moderation, including moderation.’) On this reading, elec-
toral success requires parties to compromise with the median voter rather than to stalk her.
Again, this finding is strikingly consistent with the arguments of Henneberg (2009) about
the need for parties both to lead and to follow. One task for political marketing scholars – a
task in which this kind of survey data can and should play a role – is to identify how parties
can convince voters that they are doing both.
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Notes
1. Henneberg further characterizes the following and leading postures as ‘customer-led’ and ‘mar-
ket-oriented’, respectively. This interpretation of ‘market-oriented’ is diametrically opposite to
that of Lees-Marshment. In using the term here, we follow Lees-Marshment’s example.
2. One reason why Downs specifies such a minimum requirement is that he envisaged a two-party
system in which the major parties can gravitate towards the median voter confident that they will
not lose votes to parties coming up on their ‘outside’. In multiparty systems (and multidimen-
sional issue space), parties have no such insurance and so have to be more mindful of pleasing
their traditional ideological constituencies.
3. Indeed, some commentators suggest that one reason why David Cameron’s Conservatives
failed to scale the same opinion poll heights as ‘New’ Labour is that he did not have a similarly
public ‘Clause IV moment’.
4. Lees-Marshment’s reluctance to concede this point is understandable given her argument ‘that
market-oriented political marketing makes parties more responsive to people which is ulti-
mately the point of democracy’ (2001a: 229). That normative argument loses most of its force
if the responsiveness is to a tiny segment of the electorate in a handful of target seats.
5. There is a roughly analogous argument in the marketing literature, in which ‘brand extensions’
– broadly speaking, attempts to take a brand into new markets – have the potential for detrimen-
tal effects on overall evaluations of the brand (e.g. Czellar, 2003; Loken and John, 1993).
6. These are first attempts at describing the orientations to survey respondents, and further work is
needed. The wording for market orientation is particularly difficult, since descriptions can eas-
ily make parties sound either cynically opportunistic or selflessly responsive.
7. The study incorporated a wording experiment: half of the sample was given the cognitive ‘do
you think of yourself as . . . ?’ version of the partisanship question; the other half was given an
affective version in which respondents were asked ‘do you feel that you are . . . ?’ The analyses
here are based on the sample collapsed across those conditions. While the wording manipula-
tion has a considerable impact in certain contexts (see, e.g., Burden (2008)), it had no signifi-
cant influence over the results here. None of the substantive conclusions drawn in this article
were any different when we tested the models on only those respondents in the standard ‘think
of yourself’ condition.
8. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that ‘don’t know’ responses are likely to come disproportionately
from less interested and less aware respondents (Krosnick, 1999: 557–558). Later analyses, then,
from which non-respondents are excluded, will be based on a sub-sample better able to cope with
complicated or unclear questions. If even their answers are out of line with the predictions of
political marketing research, then those predictions will come under stronger suspicion.
9. The large amounts of non-response on the Liberal Democrat questions means that, with listwise
deletion, we lose a hefty proportion of the sample as indicated by the Ns here. However, having
retested the models omitting the Liberal Democrat perception questions and thus boosting the
sample size, we obtained very similar results and identical substantive conclusions.
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